Public Participation in Times of Privatisation: A Human Rights Analysis by Temperman, J.D. (Jeroen)
www.erasmuslawreview.nl Erasmus Law Review, Volume 4, Issue 2 (2011)
© Jeroen Temperman 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN TIMES OF 
PRIVATISATION: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS
Jeroen Temperman*
Abstract
Privatisation may not only affect the enjoyment of the right to public participation itself, but might 
also impact other substantive rights. This article charts some of the ramifications of privatisation 
in relation to individual human rights as enshrined in international human rights conventions, 
with a particular focus on the impact privatisation has on the right to public participation. The 
right to public participation can be seen as both an example of a fundamental right that may 
be affected by processes of privatisation and, at the same time, potentially being the key to 
remedying (part of) the adverse impact privatisation has on the enjoyment of other fundamental 
rights.
Keywords: public participation, privatisation, human rights, informed consent in decision-
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1 Introduction
The traditional protection mechanism that underlies and motivates international human 
rights law is rather straightforward. The state is identified as the principal duty bearer, 
whilst the individual is the primary rights holder, and thus the main beneficiary of this 
body of law. Put another way, in the international legal order it is typically only the 
state (i.e. not private actors) that can be directly held accountable for a violation of 
applicable international human rights standards. Thus, the foundational principles of 
international human rights law regarding the addressees of this body of law unveil 
inherent shortcomings – some of which were arguably hard to anticipate when the 
international human rights framework was first developed at the end of the Second 
World War. A number of these inherent shortcomings can be pinpointed as follows:
 - First, international human rights law has only limited potential to hold 
non-state actors (e.g. transnational corporations, companies, organisations, 
individuals) directly accountable for violations of human rights law. 
 - Second, the optimal impact of international human rights law could 
become subverted if the state were to lose control over what traditionally 
were considered public affairs (e.g. through processes of privatisation or 
globalisation), since under international law no alternative (private) party 
is necessarily designated by default as principal or derived duty bearer.
This article will deal with the second shortcoming described above. The issue of 
privatisation can meaningfully be distinguished from the problématique surrounding 
non-state actors. The issue of the (non-)accountability of non-state actors in principle 
pertains to all adverse effects of acts or omissions not attributable to the state, including 
not only acts of private companies but also, for instance, acts of NGOs, international 
organizations, or private persons. It is clear that not all instances of wrongful acts 
attributable to non-state actors are linked to processes of privatisation. In recent years, 
(quasi-) legal initiatives, studies, and legal doctrine dealing with the issue of the 
accountability of non-state actors have mushroomed.1 These initiatives range from soft 
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1 For some of the work in these fields, see e.g.: P. Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights 
(2005); A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (2006); CSR studies include: ILO, 
Governance, International Law & Corporate Social Responsibility (ILO/ International Institute for Labour 
Studies Research series no. 116, 2008); on self-regulation, see for instance: A. Kolk & R. van Tulder, 
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law benchmarking, self-regulation, discourses on corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
to actual legal strategies to prevent impunity in the area of wrongful acts committed by 
non-state actors. Different stakeholders, with the overall view towards improving the 
effectiveness and impact of international human rights law, have looked into various 
legal methods for holding non-state actors directly or indirectly accountable. Such 
proposals have, for instance, involved attempts to hold non-state actors accountable for 
breaching national law within the domestic legal order (e.g. tort law). This strategy may 
occasionally remedy a concrete situation of impunity under international law, but will 
ultimately not contribute to direct accountability of non-state actors for acting contrary 
to international human rights law. Alternatively, responsibility for adverse practice by 
non-state actors is occasionally realized through the (derivative) responsibility of states. 
That is to say, wrongful acts committed by non-state actors may under circumstances 
be attributed to states (e.g. if states remained in control of the situation); or states may 
occasionally be considered to be responsible by omission, that is, for failing to comply 
with applicable due diligence obligations (i.e. the state should have controlled the 
situation better). These strategies, too, may prove successful in concrete instances, but 
either way we are back to the responsibility of states for wrongful acts, something not 
necessarily conducive to holding non-state actors directly accountable for international 
wrongful acts. 
 Having said that, it will be clear at the same time that the issue of privatisation may 
in specific instances be more or less inextricably linked with the problems surrounding 
the (non-)accountability of non-state actors. Privatisation might, after all, turn former 
state(-controlled) organs into private actors. 
 Turning to examine the main focus of this account – the privatisation of public 
affairs – this contribution will address the impact of this phenomenon in the context of 
human rights law. Stated in general terms, the issue is as follows: states make widely 
varying commitments by virtue of signing up to international human rights treaties. 
These include pledges to uphold basic civil liberties of the individual, commitments 
concerning equal treatment of all persons, guarantees in the field of political rights, 
as well as economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to work and adequate 
working conditions, the right to social security, the right to an adequate standard of living 
including adequate food, water, clothing and housing, and the right of access to health 
care as well as education. The process of privatisation creates a situation whereby the 
actor who is considered to be the primary duty bearer under international law – the state 
– is not de facto responsible for the goods or services at hand. That is to say, although 
legally speaking the state can still be identified as having primary responsibility under 
international human rights law, its official commitments are belied by the (low) level of 
control it exercises in the relevant areas. 
 As a consequence, privatisation affects the enjoyment of the right to public 
participation itself, but might also impact on other substantive rights. In section 2, the 
international standards on public participation will be outlined. Paradoxically, when 
participatory rights are most expressly spelled out in the relevant convention (i.e. 
ICCPR), the related treaty-monitoring body (i.e. Human Rights Committee) shows 
reluctance to construe that norm beyond traditional suffrage rights. It is the other core 
UN human rights treaties and benchmarks formulated by related treaty-monitoring 
bodies that have either pro-actively mainstreamed participatory rights with other 
substantive human rights guarantees, or that insist on more direct rights of informed 
consent. Although this trend did not necessarily result from privatisation, it could be 
argued that these broader participatory norms may nevertheless serve a purpose in the 
light of this challenge. The impact of privatisation on other substantive rights will also 
be elaborated upon. In section 3, it will be argued that the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights presently appears to be the most progressive body in terms 
‘The Effectiveness of Self-regulation: Corporate Codes of Conduct and Child Labour’, 20 European 
Management Journal 3, at 260–271. In 2000, the UN launched the UN Global Compact, an initiative 
to encourage private business enterprises to align themselves with international human rights standards 
(among other things, such as combating corruption). For the UN Global Compact principles, its mandate 
and initiatives, consult: <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/>.
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of mainstreaming the right to public participation with substantive (socio-economic) 
rights. Section 4 considers the limits of what can be attained by way of participatory 
rights with reference to the privatisation of education.
2 The Right to Public Participation
Let us begin by scrutinizing the general standards concerning the right to public 
participation in light of the challenges posed by privatisation. Under international human 
rights law, every citizen has the right and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of 
public affairs. Privatisation problematises the state’s obligations in the following ways. 
Due to privatisation, the scope of what constitutes public affairs diminishes, meaning 
that in the absence of corresponding safeguards, or a necessary contemporary discourse 
on rethinking participatory rights, the legal potential of the right to public participation 
might diminish accordingly. Under international law, it is far from self-evident that 
wherever the state steps down from its formal role as principal provider, a private duty 
bearer steps in by default. This private provider may be subject to domestic regulations, 
but will hardly ever be considered to be truly, directly subject to international standards. 
Typically, this private entity will not even qualify as an international legal subject 
proper. Naturally, this does not mean that international human rights law ceases to apply 
altogether once the state steps down from its role as provider of certain – traditionally 
considered public – goods or services. On the contrary, it is the state that signed up to 
the original obligation to ensure various individual entitlements, and it remains the state 
that may be held accountable for failing to live up to that original commitment. 
 These considerations do not, as such, rule out the possibility for the state to step 
down as the principal provider in any of the relevant former public areas, be it regarding 
civic or socio-economic entitlements. However, these considerations do suggest that in 
such instances it all the more pressing for the state to have guarantees in place ensuring 
that (former) public goods and services are properly and equally accessible, or – as the 
case may be – allocated in an equitable fashion. The state may ultimately be legally 
responsible for any failure. This would generally be the case if and when it is possible to 
prove that inequitable access or allocation by private providers is (despite privatisation) 
nonetheless attributable to the state. This would occur if the state continues to exercise 
a degree of control over the service or good at stake. Despite the absence of a clear 
attribution of inequitable – or otherwise wrongful – conduct to the state, it may still be 
possible to prove that the state did not comply with applicable due diligence obligations 
and thus is ultimately responsible as a consequence. A due diligence obligation, in 
the present context, could be described as a positive obligation upon the state going 
beyond the mere avoidance of acting in breach of fundamental rights, and extending 
to all necessary efforts aimed at actively preventing third parties from infringing upon 
fundamental rights. 
 Applying this to the right to public participation, the following may be considered. 
First of all, under international law, it is the state that must ensure that every citizen 
enjoys the right and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs. This 
does not imply that privatisation within the realm of public affairs is entirely out of the 
question. However, the existence of the international norms concerning participatory 
rights, and the importance attached to them, would imply that eminent positive 
obligations are incumbent upon the state to ensure that privatisation of the public realm 
goes hand in hand with introducing guarantees for continued respect for the population’s 
participatory rights. 
 Before it can be assessed how far these positive obligations extend in the context 
of privatisation, one needs to understand the meaning and scope of the right to 
public participation. Depending on how widely or narrowly the actual right to public 
participation is interpreted, one can make assessments as to the (potential) impact of 
privatisation on this right, as well as to the continued meaning, scope and pertinence of 
this right in times of privatisation in light of apparent positive obligations.
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2.1 The Meaning and Scope of the Right to Public Participation: The 
Traditional Nexus with Political Power
It is first necessary to outline the meaning and scope of the right to public participation 
as originally laid down by the drafters of the International Bill of Rights, and to make an 
inventory of what state obligations precisely emanate from this norm. The mother of all 
contemporary formulations of participatory rights provided for a rather narrow framing. 
Article 21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provides: 
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; 
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall 
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures.2
Participatory rights, as set out in the UDHR, are largely limited to suffrage and the right 
to run for public office, and are guaranteed in relation to participation in the government. 
The right ‘to take part in the government of one’s country’, and the corresponding 
suffrage rights, are arguably narrower than ‘a right and the opportunity to take part in 
the conduct of public affairs’, as enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966).3 The ICCPR provides in article 25:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of 
the distinctions [such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status] and 
without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall 
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his 
country.
According to Nowak, the change from government to public affairs did not so much 
occur as a result of the desire to broaden the scope of participatory rights, but rather 
is indicative of the drafters being ‘intentionally vague in order to allow States parties 
to structure the right to democratic participation in a manner consistent with the 
various models of democracy’.4 Whereas the UDHR is strictly speaking a non-binding 
Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly (although it is largely considered to 
represent customary international law), the ICCPR binds the 167 states that are party to 
it.5 However, a number of states have expressed reservations (partly or altogether) to the 
legal ramifications of article 25.6
 Turning to the question concerning the precise meaning and scope of participatory 
rights contained in this covenant, it is useful to commence with the beneficiary of this 
right. In this respect the ICCPR provision on public participation is, in actual fact, 
narrower than the UDHR equivalent: Article 25 ICCPR purports not to protect the rights 
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), 10 
December 1948 [hereinafter the UDHR]. 
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 16 December 1966 (entered into force: 23 
March 1976) [hereinafter the ICCPR].
4 M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2005), at 570.  
5 State of play at the time of writing (February 2011).
6 Including: Kuwait (reservation to article 25(b)); Monaco; Pakistan; Switzerland; and the UK (reservation 
to Article 25(b) and (c)). Both Finland and Sweden have objected to the reservations of Kuwait. Both 
Chile (in 1976) and Georgia (in 2007) have derogated from Article 25 as a result of a state of emergency 
(something that is permitted as long as such derogations are in accordance with Article 4 ICCPR).
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of everyone but of citizens only. In recognition of the difference between article 25 and 
the other Convention rights, the Human Rights Committee is adamant that states should 
report their national legal provisions defining citizenship.7 Moreover, the Committee 
also stated that: 
No distinctions are permitted between citizens in the enjoyment of these 
rights on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Distinctions between those who are entitled to citizenship by birth and 
those who acquire it by naturalisation may raise questions of compatibility 
with article 25. State reports should indicate whether any groups, such as 
permanent residents, enjoy these rights on a limited basis, for example, 
by having the right to vote in local elections or to hold particular public 
service positions.8 
Regarding the content and scope of the right, article 25 expressly provides that citizens 
shall have the right and the opportunity to take part directly in the conduct of public 
affairs, or indirectly through freely chosen representatives.
 Exercising one’s voting rights in relation to (representative) public affairs bodies 
(i.e. the gist of indirect participation), cannot readily remedy the adverse effects of 
privatisation, as it is the process of privatisation that precisely prejudices what constitutes 
public affairs. Hence, the present account is mostly concerned with possible modalities 
to give effect to direct participation, such as consultation schemes, referendums/
plebiscites/ballot questions, taking part in popular assemblies, or other forms of directly 
involving stakeholders in decision-making processes. This is in addition to actively 
running for public office and potentially exercising power as a member of a legislative 
body or by holding executive office, which also falls under direct participation. 
 Some brief consideration of indirect participation (exercising voting rights) would 
also appear to be appropriate as a preamble, if only to contextualize and appreciate its 
counterpart. Although the Committee formally adheres to the subsidiarity principle and 
holds that indirect participation can be realized in a multitude of different constitutional 
systems,9 the Committee has repeatedly hinted that a democracy is the only system of 
political organization compatible with the Covenant.10 The suffrage rights enshrined in 
paragraph (b) of Article 25 further conceptualise the right to take part in public affairs 
indirectly.11 A significant part of the workings of the Human Rights Committee on this 
article (in terms of its relevant General Comment, Concluding Observations on state 
reports, and Views in relation to individual communications) aim at conceptualising this 
7 General Comment 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal 
access to public service (Art. 25), (Fifty-seventh session, 1996), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 
(1996), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 168 (2003) [hereinafter the General Comment 25], 
at para. 3.
8 Id., at para. 3.
9 Id., at para. 21 where the Committee holds that ‘the Covenant does not impose any particular electoral 
system.’
10 Id., at para. 1. The express link between participatory rights and democracy has only been made by the 
Committee after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The Committee considers that ‘Article 25 lies at the core 
of democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the 
Covenant’. In the same document the Committee refers once to the ‘democratic process’ which may not be 
‘distorted’ (para. 19). Marshall v. Canada, Communication No. 205/l986, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/205/
l986 at 40 (1991), was one of the first cases in which the Committee referred to the (need for a) ‘democratic 
State’ (at para. 5.5). In subsequent decisions, this has become common practice, e.g.: Debreczeny v. The 
Netherlands, Communication No. 500/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/500/1992 (1995), at paras. 4.2, 
7.1, 7.3, and 9.3 (the ‘democratic decision-making process’), and at para. 7.9 (‘democratic decision-
making procedures’), and at para. 8.4 (‘democratic rules’). See also, e.g.: Robert W. Gauthier v. Canada, 
Communication No 633/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/65/D/633/1995 (5 May 1999) at para. 13.5; Dergachev 
v. Belarus, Communication No. 921/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/921/2000 (2002), at para. 2.3; Yong-
Joo Kang v. Republic of Korea, Communication No. 878/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999 (2003), 
at para. 2.5; Kim Jong-Cheol v. Republic of Korea, Communication No. 968/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/84/D/968/2001 (2005), at para. 8.3.
11 Cf. General Comment 25, at para. 7 (final sentence).
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specific aspect of participatory rights: indirect participation through genuine elections 
and indeed through exercising one’s suffrage rights.12 The ICCPR’s emphasis on suffrage 
rights, as the key towards enjoyment of the right to public participation, is perhaps not 
that remarkable when we compare it to other international human rights instruments and 
mechanisms. The European Convention on Human Rights does not itself contain any 
standards on public participation.13 A duty to organize regular elections was included 
into (article 3 of) the first Protocol to the ECHR, currently applicable to 45 out of the 47 
Council of Europe member states: 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable 
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free 
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.14
Though formulated as a state obligation rather than an individual entitlement, this 
principle has been construed by the European Court of Human Rights so as to entail 
individual human rights standards that can be invoked by the individual before this 
Court.15 Still, on the face of it the difference in scope with article 25 UDHR/ICCPR is 
striking: a rather thin right to vote versus a general right and opportunity to take part in 
the conduct of public affairs, including direct participation. Some of these discrepancies 
(notably the omission of the right to run for public office)16 have been tackled by the 
Court by means of an expansive reading of the cited provision. 
 As mentioned, universal suffrage in relation to (representative) public affairs bodies 
does not provide a genuine remedy for the adverse effects of privatisation, as it is the 
process of privatisation that affects what constitutes public affairs. Though the emphasis 
on suffrage rights in the ICCPR and the workings of the Human Rights Committee is 
undeniable, the right to take part in public affairs is more than a ‘mere’ right to vote. 
The question now is how far the ICCPR norms on direct public participation reach. 
The Human Rights Committee held that the conduct of ‘public affairs’ as referred to in 
article 25 of the ICCPR:
is a broad concept which relates to the exercise of political power, in 
particular the exercise of legislative, executive and administrative powers. 
It covers all aspects of public administration, and the formulation and 
implementation of policy at international, national, regional and local 
levels. The allocation of powers and the means by which individual citizens 
exercise the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs protected by 
article 25 should be established by the constitution and other laws.17
Thus, there is a clear nexus between the right to public participation – both the direct 
and the indirect dimensions of participatory rights – and the exercise of political power 
12 See id., at paras. 1, 3-4, particularly 7-15, and 19-22 on voting rights. For individual communications 
in which the Committee has touched upon suffrage rights, see e.g.: Marie-Hélène Gillot v. France, 
Communication No. 932/2000, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 at 270 (2002); Istvan Mátyus v. Slovakia, Communication 
No. 923/2000, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 (Vol. II) at 257 (2002); Guido Jacobs v. Belgium, Communication No. 
943/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/943/2000 (2004); Leonid Svetik v. Belarus, Communication No. 
927/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/927/2000 (2004); Fongum Gorji-Dinka v. Cameroon, Communication 
No. 1134/2002, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002 (2005); Kim Jong-Cheol v. Republic of Korea, 
Communication No. 968/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/84/D/968/2001 (2005). For recently expressed 
concerns about the enjoyment of voting rights in state reporting procedures, see e.g. the following 
Concluding Observations: A/57/40 vol. I (2002) 36 at para. 75(10)[UK]; A/58/40 vol. I (2003) 45 at para. 
80(8)[Luxembourg]; A/58/40 vol. I (2003) 56 at para. 82(6)[Portugal]; A/59/40 vol. I (2004) 35 at para. 
67(19)[Colombia]. 
13 [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 5, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222, 4 November 1950 (entered into force: 3 September 1953; [hereinafter also European 
Convention on Human Rights or ECHR].
14 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 9, 
20 March 1952 (entry into force: 18 May 1954). Monaco and Switzerland have signed but not ratified this 
protocol. 
15 First held by the European Court of Human Rights in Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, ECHR, 
(1987), Application no. 9267/81, 46–50.
16 E.g. Id. paras. 51–52, and in many subsequent judgments.
17 General Comment 25, at para. 5 (emphasis added).
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according to the Committee.18 As far as the above right to indirect participation is 
concerned (suffrage), the Committee stated the nexus with governmental power even 
more narrowly.19 Thus, overall, article 25 of the ICCPR protects the right to, in the 
words of the Committee, ‘participation in the public political life of the nation’.20 This 
means, among other things, that participatory rights in the ICCPR do not cover private 
employment matters such as the election of an employee to a private company’s work-
council.21 Nowak concludes for these reasons that ‘[i]n a parliamentary democracy 
based on separation of powers, the term “conduct of public affairs” is mainly limited to 
election of the legislative authority in conjunction with the commitment on the executive 
authority to observe parliamentary laws’.22 
 Notwithstanding this, the opportunity for citizens to participate directly in public 
affairs arguably goes beyond participation in legislative or executive bodies, despite the 
rather significant degree of discretion states have in designing forms of direct participation 
(see also sub-section 2.2, infra). According to the Human Rights Committee, citizens’ 
right to participate directly in the conduct of public affairs can be realized through the 
following modalities: 23
 - By enabling citizens to exercise power as members of legislative bodies or 
by holding executive office; 
 - By enabling citizens to choose or change their constitution or decide public 
issues through a referendum or other electoral processes; or:
 - By enabling citizens to take part in popular assemblies which have the 
power to make decisions about local issues or about the affairs of a 
particular community, and in bodies established to represent citizens in 
consultation with government (for these two modalities, see sub-section 
2.2); 
 - The equality principle enshrined in article 2 of the ICCPR applies to these 
different modes of direct participation, meaning that the state may not 
make arbitrary distinctions between people when it comes to giving effect 
to direct participation.24 
One important, though often exclusively emphasised aspect – arguably at the detriment 
of the other listed dimensions (see also sub-section 2.2) – of the opportunity to directly 
take part in the conduct of public affairs is the right to stand for elections. This passive 
political right is the other side of the coin of suffrage rights. This notably involves 
a right to stand for parliamentary elections, though the right equally applies to all 
‘elective offices’ according to the Human Rights Committee.25 What is striking in the 
Committee’s inventory is that the citizens’ right to participate directly in the conduct 
of public affairs must also be realised by enabling them to hold executive office. This 
guarantee is stronger than the standards on political rights provided by, for instance, the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Though article 3 of the Protocol to the ECHR 
does not explicitly provide for a right to stand for elections, this right has been read into 
the provision by the European Court of Human Rights.26 However, the European Court 
of Human Rights has repeatedly argued that article 3 of the Protocol only applies to the 
18 Cf. Id. at para. 5.
19 Id., para. 7.
20 Mümtaz Karakurt v. Austria, Communication No. 965/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/ 965/2000 
(2002), para. 8.2
21 Precisely what Karakurt v. Austria, Id., revolved around. 
22 Nowak, above n. 4, at 570-571.
23 General Comment 25, para. 6.
24 Id.
25 The Committee devotes paras. 15-18 of General Comment 25 to the right to stand for elective offices.
26 See, e.g., Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, ECHR, (1987), Application no. 9267/81, 51; 
Melnychenko v. Ukraine, ECHR, (2004), Application No. 17707/02, para. 54; Ždanoka v. Latvia, ECHR, 
(2006), Application No. 58278/00, 102; Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECHR, (2009), 
Applications Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, 50. However, cases concerning the dissolution of political 
parties (e.g. the series of European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on the dissolution of political 
parties in Turkey) tend to be discussed under Article 11 of the ECHR on freedom of association. 
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‘legislator’.27 This means that under the European Convention system individual claims 
concerning illegitimate obstacles or discriminatory bars to eligibility to hold executive 
office cannot be scrutinized in light of Article 3 of the aforementioned Protocol.28 In 
any event, in both the view of the Human Rights Committee and the European Court 
of Human Rights, the right to stand for elections is intended to enable participation in 
governmental bodies. The difference between the two approaches is that for the Human 
Rights Committee, the right to stand for elections is not the only imaginable means of 
enjoying one’s right to actively take part in the conduct of public affairs.
 The caveats that apply to suffrage apply equally to the right to run for public office: 
it offers only a limited potential to remedy the effects of privatisation, as processes of 
privatisation unabatedly expropriate public offices’ core business: public affairs. 
 Thus far, the specific (equal) right to have access to public service in one’s country 
has not been addressed. Article 25(c) of the ICCPR, reiterating a similar formula 
enshrined in the UDHR, deals with the opportunity of citizens to have access, upon 
general terms of equality, to public service positions. The case law of the Human Rights 
Committee revolves predominantly around (dismissal from) civil servant positions. It 
is interesting to note that ‘public service positions’ are not in actual fact defined by the 
ICCPR.29 Processes of globalisation and privatisation might, in other words, also affect 
this specific dimension of participatory rights. Starting with the former process, it is not 
at all certain that positions in inter-governmental organizations can engage protection of 
article 25. In H. v. The Netherlands, the Committee declared a complaint about alleged 
ill-treatment of the applicant by the European Patent Office to be inadmissible as this 
issue was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Netherlands (and hence did not come 
within the monitoring jurisdiction of the Committee).30 
 Turning to the issue of privatisation, as neither the ICCPR nor the workings of the 
Human Rights Committee pinpoints what constitutes a civil servant position, there is a 
risk that only clear-cut legislative, executive and judiciary positions will automatically 
engage protection by article 25(c) of the ICCPR. Beyond the realm of these positions, 
as Nowak observes, ‘[i]t depends on the national legal system whether public service 
includes other posts attributable to the State where a person is appointed under a private 
contract or exercises non-executive functions. This particularly applies to posts in 
27 For an elaboration of what constitutes the legislature in the view of the European Court of Human 
Rights, see R.C.A. White and C. Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (2010), at 522–523. 
28 E.g.: in Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECHR, (2009), Applications Nos. 27996/06 and 
34836/06, the European Court of Human Rights deals with allegations of discrimination concerning the 
possibility of holding the office of the Presidency of the Republic under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to 
the ECHR, which provides for a general non-discrimination principle. In the aforementioned case, the two 
applicants contested the ineligibility (on grounds of their Roma and Jewish origin) to stand for election to 
both the House of Peoples (which was considered a legislative body) and the office of Presidency.
29 The Human Rights Committee in its relevant General Comment and Views on individual communications 
has, however, elaborated that equal access implies that the criteria and processes for appointment, promotion, 
suspension and dismissal must be objective and reasonable, that affirmative measures may be taken in 
appropriate cases to ensure that there is equal access to public service for all citizens, and that there may no 
discrimination on the ground of political opinion or expression. See General Comment 25, at paras. 23–25. 
See also, e.g., Adimayo M. Aduayom, Sofianou T. Diasso and Yawo S. Dobou v. Togo, Communications Nos. 
422/1990, 423/1990 and 424/1990, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990 and 424/1990(1996), 
para. 7.5.
30 H. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 217/1986, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 70 (1990). The 
European Court of Human Rights, considering the fact that the ECHR does not contain relevant provisions 
that provide protection to civil servants, and considering the fact that international organizations themselves 
will often enjoy immunities before domestic courts, has opted to assess this type of cases (concerning the 
legal position of international civil servants) in light of the right to access to a court (or more generally the 
right to have one’s case heard) and the right to an effective remedy. In such cases as Waite and Kennedy 
v. Germany, ECHR, (2009), Application No. 26083/94; and Beer and Regan v. Germany, ECHR, (2009), 
Application no. 28934/95, the Court formulated its ‘reasonable alternative means’ test (resp. para. 68 and 
58), meaning that a domestic court granting full immunity to the international organization at hand (for 
instance in cases revolving around ill-treatment of employees) does not act contrary to the ECHR only 
if reasonable alternative means, such as review or appeals boards within the international organization 
itself, were available to effectively protect the rights under the ECHR. For a comprehensive analysis, see 
C. Ryngaert, ‘The Immunity of International Organizations Before Domestic Courts: Recent trends’, 7(1) 
International Organizations Law Review (2010), at 132–144.
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State schools, universities, broadcasting authorities or other State undertakings and 
services’.31 Thus, two scenarios may affect the scope of protection offered by article 
25(c) of the ICCPR: (i) certain positions de facto revolving around providing public 
servicers may, under certain domestic legal systems, de jure not be regarded as ‘public 
service positions’; and (ii) present public service positions may lose that status through 
processes of privatisation. With respect to the first instance, it stands to reason that the 
Human Rights Committee is in a position to autonomously determine that a position is 
of a public nature should a domestic label be at odds with the objectively public nature 
of this position. As for the second scenario, to the extent that the public value of the 
service is indeed at stake, the state will be under a due diligence obligation to ensure that 
equal and appropriate access is guaranteed by the new provider.32 
 Once more the previous caveat can be reiterated: the right to have access to the 
public service offers only a limited potential to remedy the effects of privatisation, as 
processes of privatisation also affect the public service in so far as ‘public affairs’ are 
expropriated from it. 
2.2 Participation in Decision-Making Beyond the Realm of Suffrage or the 
Right to Run for Public Office: An Answer to Privatisation?
Returning to the Human Rights Committee’s inventory of the modalities of active 
participation in the conduct of public affairs, the question remains as to how far positive 
state obligations to enable citizens to directly participate in public affairs extend. How 
far does the citizens’ right to choose or change their constitution or to decide public 
issues through a referendum or other decision-making processes stretch?33 How far is 
the reach of the positive obligation to enable citizens to take part in popular assemblies 
that have the power to make decisions about local issues or about the affairs of a 
particular community, or the right to take part in bodies established to represent citizens 
in consultation with government?34 It is the latter opportunity and corresponding state 
obligation in particular, that would appear particularly pertinent in times of privatisation.
 In Marshall v. Canada, the authors of the communication to the Human Rights 
Committee complained that they, the representatives of the Mikmaq people, were 
not invited to attend the constitutional conferences on aboriginal matters.35 More 
particularly, Grand Chief Donald Marshall (et al.) was of the opinion that the refusal 
on the part of the Prime Minister of Canada to permit specific representation for the 
Mikmaqs at the constitutional conferences was tantamount to a violation of the right to 
take part in the conduct of public affairs. Constitutional conferences, in the view of the 
Committee, constituted ‘conduct of public affairs’ within the meaning of article 25 of 
the ICCPR.36 In an attempt to determine the precise scope of the right of every citizen 
to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the Committee commenced by pointing 
out that ‘[s]urely, it cannot be the meaning of article 25(a) of the Covenant that every 
citizen may determine either to take part directly in the conduct of public affairs or to 
leave it to freely chosen representatives. It is for the legal and constitutional system of 
the State party to provide for the modalities of such participation’.37 In other words, 
participatory rights under the ICCPR do not entail a choice on the part of the beneficiary 
of these rights as to how one’s right to public participation is best guaranteed in any 
specific case. Rather, a state party discharges its obligations if it ensures that adequate 
modalities of public participation are generally in place. Turning to the alleged violation 
of the Mikmaq people’s right to (directly) take part in the conduct of public affairs, the 
Committee concluded: 
31 Nowak, above n. 4, at 586.
32 Cf., mutatis mutandis, Robert W. Gauthier v. Canada, Communication No 633/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/65/D/ 633/1995 (5 May 1999), as outlined below (section 2.2).
33 Forms of direct participation are mentioned in General Comment 25, at para. 6.
34 Id.
35 Marshall v. Canada, Communication No. 205/l986, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/205/l986 at 40 (1991).
36 Id., para. 5.3.
37 Id., para. 5.4.
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It must be beyond dispute that the conduct of public affairs in a democratic 
State is the task of representatives of the people, elected for that purpose, 
and public officials appointed in accordance with the law. Invariably, 
the conduct of public affairs affects the interest of large segments of the 
population or even the population as a whole, while in other instances 
it affects more directly the interest of more specific groups of society. 
Although prior consultations, such as public hearings or consultations 
with the most interested groups may often be envisaged by law or have 
evolved as public policy in the conduct of public affairs, article 25(a) of 
the Covenant cannot be understood as meaning that any directly affected 
group, large or small, has the unconditional right to choose the modalities 
of participation in the conduct of public affairs. That, in fact, would be an 
extrapolation of the right to direct participation by the citizens, far beyond 
the scope of article 25(a).38 
Thus the Committee concludes that, notwithstanding the right of every citizen to take 
part in the conduct of public affairs without discrimination and without unreasonable 
restrictions, the failure of Canada to invite representatives of the Mikmaq tribal society 
to the constitutional conferences on aboriginal matters did not breach the participatory 
rights of members of the Mikmaq tribal society. 
 This conclusion begs the question: under what circumstances will the state be found 
to have acted contrary to the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs when 
forms of direct participation are at stake? After all, it was not the Mikmaq tribal society 
that has undertaken to ‘choose the modalities of participation’, as Canada had done this 
already. It was the Canadian Constitution Act itself that envisaged a process which would 
include constitutional conferences to be convened by the Prime Minister of Canada 
and attended by the first ministers of the provinces and invited ‘representatives of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada’.39 Several such conferences indeed have been convened 
by the Prime Minister of Canada. These constitutional conferences were generally 
only open for elected leaders of the federal and provincial governments; however, the 
conferences specifically dealing with aboriginal matters (such as the one at hand) formed 
an exception to this rule as they ‘focused on the matter of aboriginal self-government 
and whether and in what form, a general aboriginal right to self-government should be 
entrenched in the Constitution of Canada’.40 In sum, the state itself, through statutory 
law, had accepted that certain identified stakeholders could utilise direct modes of 
participation, in this case through consultation. Thus, in light of the specifics of the 
case, the Committee’s view that there did not exist a right to direct participation in 
abstracto is beside the point, since that right existed in Canada and, moreover, it existed 
specifically for this type of situation, where public decisions could affect the rights, 
interests and legal position of the tribal society at stake. Regardless of whether a right to 
direct participation in abstracto exists in every state or not, in cases such as the one at 
hand this right existed in concreto, given the specific circumstances of the case and the 
legitimate interests of stakeholders to be directly included in decision-making processes 
that may have affected their rights or legal status.
 The Committee’s view grants states parties a large degree of discretion to discharge 
ICCPR obligations in the field of public participation. The approach taken by the Human 
Rights Committee is perhaps understandable from the perspective of the subsidiarity 
principle, here used in the meaning that every sovereign state under international law 
is largely free to decide on its own internal system of political organization. This also 
means that states generally have a fairly free hand in deciding on the appropriate means 
to comply with their obligations flowing from international law. The Committee’s 
approach is perhaps also understandable given the fact that article 25 uses the word ‘or’ 
in paragraph (a). Nowak argues in this respect:
38 Id., para. 5.5 (emphasis added).
39 Id., para. 2.2.
40 Id. The fact that these conferences were ultimately inconclusive and that no consensus was reached on 
possible constitutional amendments does not detract from the ultimate importance of participation in such 
a process.
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… States parties are not required to create possibilities for participation 
by plebiscite. This does not, however, mean that the reference to direct 
participation is of no significance. It has the effect of giving citizens an 
individual right to take part in referendums and similar consultations 
when these are provided for by the State party...while required to hold 
periodic elections, the States parties are not required to conduct public 
consultations, such as referendums and plebiscites.41
Be that as it may, the Committee’s approach remains problematic when it results in 
genuine stakeholders being marginalized as was the case in the above example. Moreover, 
in times of privatisation, the right to take part in public affairs naturally cannot be 
expected to be fully realized ‘through freely chosen representatives’. Thus, construing 
ICCPR standards on public participation so as to impose a generic, abstract duty upon 
the state to guarantee the right to public participation through indirect modalities, with 
the main emphasis on free elections, could fall short of affording appropriate protection. 
 The question is whether the Committee’s decision in the Mikmaq tribal society case 
signifies that a concrete right to direct participation is altogether out of the question.42 
If that is indeed the lesson to be drawn here, the Committee has shot itself in the foot by 
taking that approach, and – if it were to stick to that approach – one may not expect the 
Committee to be in a position to adequately face the challenge posed by privatisation to 
the right to public participation.
 The Committee has, albeit very indirectly, had the opportunity to demonstrate 
its abilities in dealing with the issue of privatisation in other areas (some of which 
touch upon public participation), and in such cases the approach taken appeared more 
satisfactory. In Gauthier v. Canada, the Committee’s views were solicited concerning 
the compatibility with the ICCPR of a particular accreditation scheme for access to 
the precincts of Parliament.43 As such, the case did not directly revolve around the 
issue of public participation. The applicant claimed that the denial of equal access to 
press facilities in Parliament constituted a violation of his rights under article 19 of the 
Covenant: the freedom to seek and receive information.44 However, as the Committee 
pointed out in this case, the freedom to seek and receive information must be read in 
conjunction with the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs (article 25 of the 
ICCPR).45 Also in its General Comment No. 25 (on public participation) the Committee 
makes the connection between the two fundamental rights several times.46 Article 
25 and 19 read together imply that ‘citizens, in particular through the media, should 
have wide access to information and the opportunity to disseminate information and 
opinions about the activities of elected bodies and their members’.47 Mr Gauthier, who 
worked as a publisher of the National Capital News, had his freedom to seek and receive 
information restricted, as he was provided with a temporary pass that gave only limited 
41 Nowak, above n. 4, at 571-572 (emphasis added).
42 Alternatively, it could be suggested that the Committee was not convinced that the particulars of this 
case warranted the engagement of this right. However, the quoted excerpts seem to go much beyond this, 
dismissing the usage of this right as a matter of principle. As previously mentioned, the conclusion of this 
case may cause one to question what circumstances could possibly merit engagement of the right to be 
involved in the decision-making process.
43 Gauthier v. Canada, above n. 32.
44 Though some Committee Members were of the opinion that the case should have been examined in 
light of Articles 22 and 26 (respectively on freedom of association and equality before the law). See the 
different individual opinions appended to the case.
45 Gauthier v. Canada, above n. 32, at para. 13.4.
46 General Comment 25, at para. 26: ‘In order to ensure the full enjoyment of rights protected by Article 
25, the free communication of information and ideas about public and political issues between citizens, 
candidates and elected representatives is essential. This implies a free press and other media able to 
comment on public issues without censorship or restraint and to inform public opinion. It requires the 
full enjoyment and respect for the rights guaranteed in Articles 19, 21 and 22 of the Covenant, including 
freedom to engage in political activity individually or through political parties and other organizations, 
freedom to debate public affairs, to hold peaceful demonstrations and meetings, to criticize and oppose, to 
publish political material, to campaign for election and to advertise political ideas’. See also paras. 8 and 
12.
47 Gauthier v. Canada, above n. 32, at para. 13.4.
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privileges and limited access to the precincts of Parliament. The peculiarity of this case 
lies in the fact that the entity administering the accreditation for access to the precincts 
of Parliament was a private association called the Parliamentary Press Gallery. Faced 
with several contradictory statements by the state on the exact relationship between the 
Speaker of the House of Parliament and the Parliamentary Press Gallery, the Committee 
ultimately endorsed the view that ‘[w]hile the Speaker has ultimate authority over the 
physical access to the media facilities in Parliament, he is not involved in the general 
operations of these facilities which are administered and run entirely by the Press 
Gallery’.48 The Committee ultimately held that:
In the instant case, the State party has allowed a private organization to 
control access to the Parliamentary press facilities, without intervention. 
The scheme does not ensure that there will be no arbitrary exclusion from 
access to the Parliamentary media facilities. In the circumstances, the 
Committee is of the opinion that the accreditation system has not been 
shown to be a necessary and proportionate restriction of rights within the 
meaning of article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, in order to ensure the 
effective operation of Parliament and the safety of its members. The denial 
of access to the author to the press facilities of Parliament for not being a 
member of the Canadian Press Gallery Association constitutes therefore a 
violation of article 19 (2) of the Covenant.49
In sum, contracting out a (public) service to a private organisation, or in the words of 
the Committee, allowing a private organisation to be in control, does not relieve the 
state from its responsibilities under human rights law when public values are at stake.50
2.3 Post-Bill of Rights Participatory Rights: Answers to Privatisation? 
At the same time, other international human rights treaties, both universal and regional 
ones,51 provide for specific participatory rights. The preamble of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women makes it clear that one of 
the principal objectives of this UN treaty is to maximize the participation of women 
in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries.52 Participatory 
rights in CEDAW are much more than entitlements or opportunities to take part in 
48 Id., para. 11.2 (emphasis added).
49 Id., para. 13.6.
50 The latter caveat also shows the limitations of the relevant rights: if no public values whatsoever are 
at stake there can be no state obligation, and consequently no potential violation of due diligence. One 
may recall private employment matters such as the election of an employee to a private company’s work-
council, as was the case in Karakurt v. Austria, above n. 20.
51 As far as regional human rights organizations and instruments are concerned, Article 3 of the first 
Protocol of the ECHR (applicable to most Council of Europe member states) has been discussed above. 
At this point it should be added that participatory rights have been codified within the framework of both 
the Organization of American States and the African Union. See Article 23 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force 18 July 1978, reprinted in 
Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 
at 25 (1992); and Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, 
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986. Both provisions 
are largely comparable to ICCPR’s equivalent provision. Having said that, the Inter-American provision 
on participation provides for an explicit limitation clause, whereas the ICCPR and European equivalents 
make use of ‘implied restrictions’ that have been developed by the Human Rights Committee and the 
European Court of Human Rights (Article 3 of the Protocol to the ECHR does not mention any possibility 
of limitation, whilst Article 25 ICCPR merely uses the words ‘without unreasonable restrictions’). As for 
the equivalent African provision, it is interesting to note that an equal ‘right of access to public property’ is 
incorporated into the provision on public participation. 
52 See the two references to participation in the preamble of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. 
Doc. A/34/46, entered into force 3 September 1981 [hereinafter CEDAW]. CEDAW has been ratified by 
186 states (Israel and Monaco have entered partial reservations to Article 7, whilst a number of states have 
entered sweeping –religious– reservations to CEDAW in its entirety). 
 public parTicipaTion in Times of privaTisaTion: a Human rigHTs analysis 55
political affairs. The traditional right to public participation can be found in article 
7 of CEDAW which guarantees women’s rights to ‘vote in all elections and public 
referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies’ and ‘to participate 
in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold 
public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government’.53 However, 
particularly the latter provision (Article 7(b) of CEDAW) seems to go significantly 
beyond the requirements of the aforementioned general standards on governmental 
participation, implying a more general right to participation in relevant decision-making 
processes. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women holds 
that CEDAW requires states parties:
… to ensure that women have the right to participate fully in and be 
represented in public policy formulation in all sectors and at all levels. This 
would facilitate the mainstreaming of gender issues and contribute a gender 
perspective to public policy-making…States parties have a responsibility, 
where it is within their control, both to appoint women to senior decision-
making roles and, as a matter of course, to consult and incorporate the 
advice of groups which are broadly representative of women’s views and 
interests.54
The Committee has further elaborated upon possible measures that could be adopted to 
ensure equal participation by women in senior cabinet and administrative positions and 
as members of government advisory bodies: 
… adoption of a rule whereby, when potential appointees are equally 
qualified, preference will be given to a woman nominee; the adoption of a 
rule that neither sex should constitute less than 40 per cent of the members of 
a public body; a quota for women members of cabinet and for appointment 
to public office; and consultation with women’s organizations to ensure 
that qualified women are nominated for membership in public bodies and 
offices and the development and maintenance of registers of such women 
in order to facilitate the nomination of women for appointment to public 
bodies and posts.55
With regard to direct participation through advisory bodies, the Committee considered 
that ‘[w]here members are appointed to advisory bodies upon the nomination of private 
organizations, States parties should encourage these organizations to nominate qualified 
and suitable women for membership in these bodies’.56 This constitutes a clear due 
diligence obligation. The Committee has consequently acknowledged the fact that 
different national systems vary in their treatment of the public/private divide, and that 
as such, respective processes of privatisation could undermine the potential of direct 
participation. 
 Women enjoy a range of additional, varying participatory rights pursuant CEDAW:
 - the right to participate in non-governmental organizations and associations 
concerned with the public and political life of the country;
 - the opportunity to represent their Governments at the international level 
and to participate in the work of international organizations;
 - equal opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical education;
 - the right to participate in recreational activities, sports and all aspects of 
cultural life;
53 Article 7(a) and (b) of CEDAW.
54 Paras. 25–26 (emphasis added) Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
General Recommendation 23: Political and Public Life (Sixteenth session, 1997), U.N. Doc. A/52/38/Rev.1 
at 61 (1997), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 260 (2003). Subsequent paragraphs (27–28) 
specify women’s right to participation in government. 
55 Id. para. 29.
56 Id.
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 - the right to participate in the elaboration and implementation of development 
planning at all levels;
 - and the right to participate in all community activities. 57
In addition, CEDAW prescribes the following positive obligations to states parties:
 - to encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to 
enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities 
and participation in public life, in particular through promoting the 
establishment and development of a network of child-care facilities;
 - to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
in rural areas in order to ensure that women participate in and benefit from 
rural development (which also includes guarantees to the earlier mentioned 
right to participate in the elaboration and implementation of development 
planning at all levels and the right to participate in all community 
activities).58
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(whose adoption predates the ICCPR’s) already included participatory rights, albeit 
with a clear focus on political participation proper. It includes in particular: the right to 
participate in elections, the right to vote and to stand for election, and the rights to take 
part in the government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have 
equal access to public service.59 In addition, CERD enshrines a specific right to equal 
participation in cultural activities,60 a right also adopted by the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.61 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination has emphasised that states parties to CERD must especially ensure that 
‘members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of effective participation in 
public life and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests are taken 
without their informed consent’.62 The notion can certainly be welcomed from a human 
rights perspective: it offers far-reaching protection and goes significantly beyond the 
views of the Human Rights Committee that have rejected such a concrete right to direct 
public participation. 
 It is striking that the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination requires 
stakeholders’ informed consent (rather than mere informed participation) in all areas 
where stakeholders’ rights are to be considered in a decision-making processes. The 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has quite extensively engaged 
with this notion, for instance through the state reporting procedure, by repeatedly 
highlighting concerns about state practice. In this respect the Committee has, for 
instance, noted and considered the following:
 - The failure of the Costa Rican authorities to maintain communication with 
the indigenous population was seen as a matter of concern. As a result, the 
Committee called upon Costa Rica ‘to ensure that members of indigenous 
57 See Articles 7(c), 8, 13(c), 14(2)(a) and (f), of CEDAW.
58 Article 11(2)(c), 14(2), of CEDAW.
59 Article 5(c) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 
195, entered into force 4 January 1969 [hereinafter CERD]. 
60 Article 5(e)(vi) of CERD. Both rights are listed as areas in which racial discrimination ought to be 
eradicated.
61 See Article 15(1)(a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into 
force Jan. 3, 1976. This Covenant also considers that the right to education has participatory value in so far 
as promotion of the right of everyone to education ‘shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a 
free society’ (Article 13).
62 General Recommendation 23: Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Fifty-first session, 1997), U.N. 
Doc. A/52/18, annex V at 122 (1997), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.6 at 212 (2003)
(emphasis added), at para. 4
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peoples have equal rights in respect of effective participation in public life 
and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests are taken 
without their informed consent’;63
 - With respect to Botswana, the Committee expressed consternation regarding 
the discriminatory character of certain domestic laws, particularly the 
Chieftainship Act and the Tribal Territories Act which only recognize the 
Tswana-speaking tribes. As a consequence, other tribes do not enjoy their 
rights to public participation (for instance, they cannot participate in the 
House of Chiefs);64
 - With regard to New Zealand, the Committee pointed out that it remained 
‘concerned about the continuing disadvantages that Maori, Pacific Island 
people and other ethnic communities face in the enjoyment of social 
and economic rights, such as the rights to employment, housing, social 
welfare, and health care. The State party is invited to…encourage active 
and effective participation by Maori in the search for solutions such as the 
Maori Mental Health Strategic Framework adopted in May 2002, with a 
view to further reducing these disadvantages’;65
 - In relation to Saint Lucia, the Committee notes that the constitutional 
requirement to speak and read English ‘curtails the right of the indigenous 
population, the majority of whom are fluent only in Kweyol, to participate 
in political elections’;66
 - The Traveller community cannot effectively participate in the conduct 
of public affairs in Ireland, as they are not adequately recognized or 
represented in the Irish political institutions.67
From the above, it can be concluded that the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination requires from states parties precisely the type of ad hoc consultation that 
the Human Rights Committee refused to accept in the case concerning the Mikmaq tribal 
society. This approach aims to ensure that no decisions directly relating to stakeholders’ 
rights and interests are taken without their informed consent.68
 The recently adopted Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples also devotes 
ample attention to the right to public participation.69 This (as yet non-binding) Resolution 
63 A/57/18 (2002) 21 at para. 76 [Costa Rica].
64 The Committee expressed particular concern regarding some of the consequences of these shortcomings: 
‘the ongoing dispossession of Basarwa/San people from their land and…their [reported] resettlement 
outside the Central Kalahari Game Reserve does not respect their political, economic, social and cultural 
rights. The Committee…recommends that no decisions directly relating to the rights and interests of 
members of indigenous peoples be taken without their informed consent’: A/57/18 (2002) 53 at paras. 301 
and 304 [Botswana].
65 A/57/18 (2002) 69 at para. 422 [New Zealand].
66 A/59/18 (2004) 86 at para. 446 [Saint Lucia].
67 A/60/18 (2005) 30 at para. 146 [Ireland].
68 Marshall v. Canada, above n. 10. In relation to CERD, it may finally be noted that the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has been particularly active in promoting the participatory rights 
of Roma minorities. See para. 41-46 of General Recommendation 27: Discrimination against Roma (Fifty-
seventh session, 2000), U.N. Doc. A/55/18, annex V at 154 (2000), reprinted in Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\
GEN\1\Rev.6 at 216 (2003). In General Recommendation 22: Refugees and Displaced Persons (Forty-
ninth session, 1996), U.N. Doc. A/51/18, annex VIII at 126 (1996), reprinted in Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\
GEN\1\Rev.6 at 211 (2003), the Committee promoted the rights of another particularly vulnerable group 
arguing that all ‘refugees and displaced persons have, after their return to their homes of origin, the right 
to participate fully and equally in public affairs at all levels and to have equal access to public services and 
to receive rehabilitation assistance’ (para. 2, (d)). See also General Recommendation 29: Discrimination 
Based on Descent (Sixty-first session, 2002), U.N. Doc. A/57/18 at 111 (2002), reprinted in Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.6 at 223 (2003), in which the Committee emphasised the participation rights of those 
groups of people affected by discrimination based on descent (see paras. 1(e), 6 (bb), and 6 (cc)).
69 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295,U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (2007).
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holds that: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct 
political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right 
to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural 
life of the State’.70 The Declaration, going beyond general political participatory rights 
(suffrage etc.), emphasises that indigenous peoples ‘have the right to participate in 
decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives 
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain 
and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions’.71 Also at the concrete 
level of indigenous peoples’ rights, substantive freedoms or other standards are 
mainstreamed with participatory rights. For instance, in the area of land and property, 
the Declaration requires that states shall establish a fair, independent, impartial, open and 
transparent process in order to recognise and adjudicate indigenous peoples’ land and 
property claims. Establishing such a system ensures that indigenous peoples shall have 
the right to participate in this process.72 Ensuring participation of indigenous peoples on 
the adjudication of issues affecting them is also to be mainstreamed by any UN initiative 
adopted for the purposes of realising the standards set out by the Declaration.73
 For obvious reasons, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) does not 
enshrine general political participatory rights; however, certain specific rights to 
participation going beyond the traditional nexus with government and policy-making 
are codified.74 The overarching standard on children’s participation is enshrined in 
article 12 of the CRC, which prescribes a degree of respect for the views and feelings 
of the child. This provision holds that a child ‘who is capable of forming his or her own 
views’ has ‘the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the 
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of 
the child’. 
 In addition to this general principle, more specific participatory rights are recognized, 
such as the norm holding that all interested parties – including the child – shall be given 
an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views known in cases 
that revolve around potential separation of children from their parents.75 Children, too, 
enjoy the right to participate freely in cultural life and the arts.76 The Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has furthermore emphasised and mainstreamed certain dimensions 
of children’s participatory rights in its workings, such as the child’s opportunity and 
right to participate in school life;77 children’s participation in national human rights 
institutions and NGOs;78 children’s right to participate in raising awareness by speaking 
out about the impact of HIV/AIDS on their lives and in the development of HIV/AIDS 
policies and programmes;79 adolescents’ right to participate in decisions affecting their 
health (notably through informed consent and the right of confidentiality);80 and a right 
of the child to effective participation in (criminal) legal proceedings that affect him 
70 Art. 5.
71 Art. 18.
72 See Art. 27. 
73 Art. 41.
74 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, 
U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force 2 September 1990 [hereinafter CRC].
75 Art. 9(2) CRC.
76 Art. 31 CRC.
77 General Comment No. 1: The Aims of Education, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1 (2001), particularly 
para. 8. 
78 General Comment No. 2: The role of independent national human rights institutions in the promotion 
and protection of the rights of the child, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2002/2 (2002), particularly paras. 15-18, and 
19(k).
79 General Comment No. 3: HIV/AIDS and the right of the child, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/3 (2003), 
particularly paras. 12, 20, 29, and 42.
80 General Comment No. 4: Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/4 (2003), particularly paras. 8, 13, 18, and 38(b). 
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or her.81 CRC finally emphasises that states parties must try to facilitate mentally or 
physically disabled children’s active participation in the community.82 
 The very rationale of the International Convention on the Protection and Promotion 
of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities centres on fostering full and 
effective participation of persons with disabilities in society on an equal basis with 
others.83 Extensive public participation rights are encompassed in article 29 of this 
Convention. This includes not only the standard suffrage rights and the right to run 
for public office, but also more specific duties aiming to ensure an ‘environment in 
which persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in the conduct of 
public affairs’.84 These rights are also expressly extended to participation in NGOs and 
‘associations concerned with the public and political life of the country’.85 Measures to 
secure the participation of persons with disabilities further include rights to take part in 
cultural life;86 rights to overall accessibility of the public space;87 participation in the 
community;88 access to education, including a right to benefit from education in order to 
participate effectively in a free society;89 and participation in the monitoring process of 
rights of persons with disabilities, at both the national level as well as the international 
(UN) level.90 
 The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families contains a political participation clause (which 
boils down to a right to public participation in one’s state of origin, not in the state 
of employment)91 and some provisions that extend beyond political participation. 
This convention prescribes, for instance, that states of employment must facilitate 
the consultation or participation of migrant workers and members of their families in 
decisions concerning life and administration in local communities.92 
 In sub-section 2.1 (above) it was stated that the right to public participation has 
traditionally been rather tightly linked with the exercise of governmental power; that is, 
participatory rights encompassing a right to engage, actively or passively, in politics. In 
this sub-section it has been noted that a number of specialised human rights conventions 
have broadened the scope of participatory rights considerably, although the question 
still remains as to whether such expansion has sufficiently equipped the international 
human rights machinery in order to face the challenge posed by privatisation. 
 Indeed, virtually all UN core human rights conventions have broadened the scope 
of participatory rights beyond the realm of democratic rights. In addition, virtually all 
treaty-monitoring bodies have commenced mainstreaming participatory rights with 
81 General Comment No. 10: Children’s rights in juvenile justice (Forty-fourth session, 2007), U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/GC/10 (2007).see particularly para. 46.
82 Art. 23(1) CRC. Further elaborated upon by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in General 
Comment No. 9: The rights of children with disabilities (Forty-third session, 2007), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/9 
(2007), see particularly paras. 1, 7, 11, 25, 32, 33, 37, 48, and 71 on their participatory rights specifically.
83 See the preamble, and general principle (c) of art. 3, of the International Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, Annex I, U.N. 
GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/61/49 (2006), entered into force 3 May 2008. See also 
the work in this area by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, particularly: General 
Comment No. 5: Persons with disabilities (Eleventh session, 1994), U.N. Doc E/1995/22 at 19 (1995), 
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 24 (2003). Note that the EU recently has codified a right of 
persons with disabilities to participate in the life of the community: art. 26 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01, which has legally binding force as per the Lisbon Treaty. 
84 Article 29(b).
85 Article 29(b)(i).
86 Article 30.
87 Article 9.
88 Article 19.
89 Article 24.
90 Articles 33(3) and 34(4).
91 See Article 41 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families, G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, U.N. 
Doc. A/45/49 (1990), entered into force 1 July 2003. 
92 Article 42(2). Other participatory rights can be found in Article 43(g)(participation in cultural life) and 
51 (participation in public work schemes).
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other fundamental rights; that is, the legal exercise of reading the right to (public) 
participation in conjunction with other substantive human rights enshrined in the 
respective convention. However, not every instance discussed so far would appear to 
have been inspired by the need to tackle the challenges posed by privatisation. More 
often than not, the need for extending the scope of participatory rights to specific areas 
covered by substantive human rights is considered as a necessary end in itself (e.g. 
children’s participation in national human rights institutions; participation of migrant 
workers in decisions concerning the life and administration of local communities; or 
participation by persons with disabilities in the monitoring process of rights of persons 
with disabilities). 
 The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has more 
or less acknowledged the issue of privatisation,93 but has barely elaborated upon the 
pertinent questions posed by this process. The Human Rights Committee has hardly 
acknowledged the impact of privatisation on the right to public participation (save in 
the interrelated area of access to information).94 Moreover, from the Views issued by 
the Human Rights Committee one could deduce the notion that there is no such thing 
as a concrete right to direct participation by stakeholders (possibly even in the event 
privatisation affects legitimate interests). It may be argued that a more satisfactory 
reading of the use of the word ‘or’ in paragraph (a) of Article 25 of the ICCPR would 
require that the state take into account all relevant specific (political as well as macro-
economic; national as well as local) circumstances, including processes of privatisation. 
This approach could mean that the occasional specific circumstances warrant fulfilment 
of a concrete right to be involved in decision-making processes, namely when decisions 
could affect the rights or legal position of identifiable stakeholders. 
 In this respect, the Human Rights Committee’s approach would benefit from the 
approach taken by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning 
similar questions. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has 
predominantly – and given the nature of its mandate perhaps not surprisingly so 
– engaged with the problems posed by nationalisation or expropriation (rather than 
privatisation), particularly in the area of land and property rights of indigenous peoples. 
Be that as it may, this Committee has repeatedly argued that effective participation in 
public life also means that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests may 
be taken without the informed consent of stakeholders – a notion that may also prove 
very valuable and pertinent regarding the issue of privatisation. 
 It has been argued that privatisation might affect the enjoyment of fundamental 
rights: thus far the focus has been on the right to public participation, its general as 
well as its more specific versions, how far these rights stretch, and to what extent 
different monitoring bodies have responded – or failed to respond – to the challenge of 
privatisation. The next step is to come to terms with the fact that also other fundamental 
rights may be affected by processes of privatisation. Presently, it is solely the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that truly deals practically with the issue of 
privatisation in its work. Also, it is certainly no coincidence that the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has, in recent times, started mainstreaming 
participatory rights with the substantive human rights it monitors, especially in those 
areas where the individual is dependent on a private provider to pick the fruits of one’s 
individual (socio-economic) entitlements.
3 Mainstreaming Participatory Rights with Socio-Economic Rights as an 
Answer to Privatisation
The fact that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights acknowledges, 
chiefly in its general comments, the need to thoroughly mainstream the right to public 
participation with substantive socio-economic rights is all the more interesting in light 
93 See text referenced by and within above n. 56.
94 See Gauthier v. Canada, above n. 32, and the surrounding text.
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of the fact that the ICESCR does not, in actual fact, contain a generic (political) right to 
public participation.95 Thus, this ongoing mainstreaming exercise is the representation 
par excellence of the doctrine of the indivisibility of human rights. 
 These mainstreaming exercises are most apparent in the areas of (entitlements to): 
adequate housing; adequate food and water; employment; social security; health; socio-
economic rights of persons with a disability; rights to benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production; 
and the more generic issue of the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
 In the area of housing, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights first 
of all points out that processes of privatisation do not discharge the state’s obligations to 
ensure adequate housing:
Measures designed to satisfy a State party’s obligations in respect of the 
right to adequate housing may reflect whatever mix of public and private 
sector measures considered appropriate. While in some States public 
financing of housing might most usefully be spent on direct construction 
of new housing, in most cases, experience has shown the inability of 
Governments to fully satisfy housing deficits with publicly built housing. 
The promotion by States parties of “enabling strategies”, combined with 
a full commitment to obligations under the right to adequate housing, 
should thus be encouraged. In essence, the obligation is to demonstrate 
that, in aggregate, the measures being taken are sufficient to realize the 
right for every individual in the shortest possible time in accordance with 
the maximum of available resources.96 
Furthermore, domestic legal remedies must be in place so as to address complaints 
against illegal actions carried out or supported by landlords (e.g. in relation to rent 
levels), whether public or private.97 Turning to the importance of public participation, 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has considered that, presently, 
the right to adequate housing (included in article 11 of the ICESCR) could become 
meaningless if this right continues to be viewed in isolation from other fundamental 
rights, notably ‘the right to participate in public decision-making’.98 The Committee 
argues that a state’s national housing strategy: 
should reflect extensive genuine consultation with, and participation by, all 
of those affected, including the homeless, the inadequately housed and their 
representatives. Furthermore, steps should be taken to ensure coordination 
between ministries and regional and local authorities in order to reconcile 
related policies (economics, agriculture, environment, energy, etc.) with 
the obligations [in the area of adequate housing].99
Special legislation protecting people from forced evictions must not only apply in 
relation to all agents acting under the authority of the state or who are accountable to 
it. The Committee argues that states ‘in view of the increasing trend in some States 
towards their government greatly reducing their responsibilities in the housing sector’, 
must ensure that legislative measures are in place to prevent or punish illegitimate 
forced evictions carried out by private actors.100
95 The ICESCR does contain a specific right to take part in cultural life. See also: text referenced by and 
within above n. 61.
96 General Comment 4: The right to adequate housing (Sixth session, 1991), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, annex 
III at 114 (1991), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 18 (2003), para. 14. 
97 Id., para 17. See also: para. 8 on private accommodation. 
98 Id., para. 9, also explicitly referring to the need to read in conjunction the two Covenants (i.e. the 
ICESCR and the ICCPR) on these issues.
99 Id., para. 12.
100 General Comment 7: Forced evictions, and the right to adequate housing (Sixteenth session, 1997), 
U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, annex IV at 113 (1997), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General 
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 Concerning the food sector, the Committee has similarly acknowledged the 
potentially negatively effect that the ongoing processes of privatisation may have on the 
enjoyment of the right to adequate food. The Committee has stated that states parties 
to the ICESCR should ‘take appropriate steps to ensure that activities of the private 
business sector and civil society are in conformity with the right to food’ as part of 
their obligations to protect people’s food resource base.101 Among other things, the 
Committee infers from this general obligation the specific duty requiring a national 
strategy on access to adequate food to be put in place, paying particular attention to 
necessary collaboration with the private sector (as well as civil society and international 
organizations).102 Again, we see how the Committee tries to nip in the bud challenges 
posed by privatisation by mainstreaming access to food policies with participatory rights 
of stakeholders (who are in this case, everyone). The Committee holds that the actual 
formulation and implementation of national strategies for the right to food requires full 
compliance with the principle of ‘people’s participation’.103 It is interesting to note that 
in the area of equal access to adequate food, the Committee goes one step further still. 
Short of considering the private food sector direct duty bearers under international law, 
the Committee urges private providers to assume responsibility in the area of access to 
adequate food: 
While only States are parties to the Covenant and are thus ultimately 
accountable for compliance with it, all members of society - individuals, 
families, local communities, non-governmental organizations, civil society 
organizations, as well as the private business sector - have responsibilities 
in the realization of the right to adequate food. The State should provide 
an environment that facilitates implementation of these responsibilities. 
The private business sector – national and transnational - should pursue its 
activities within the framework of a code of conduct conducive to respect 
of the right to adequate food, agreed upon jointly with the Government and 
civil society.104
Elsewhere, the Committee further reiterates this, emphasising that a right to adequate 
food includes access to food free from adverse substances, which can only be realised if 
both public and private providers take protective measures.105 
 In the area of access to water, the challenges faced by privatisation are equally 
acknowledged, as is the necessary focus on the right to participation in essential 
decision-making processes, as the key to mediating the adverse effects in this area. 
States parties must adopt the necessary measures to ensure that water distribution 
services are affordable for all.106 The Committee further considers that: ‘In order to 
create a favourable climate for the realization of the right, States parties should take 
appropriate steps to ensure that the private business sector and civil society are aware 
of, and consider the importance of, the right to water in pursuing their activities’.107 
Again, this means that the state’s national strategy on access to water should pay special 
attention to necessary collaboration with the private sector. The key to successfully 
tackling the issue lies in public participation:
Where water services (such as piped water networks, water tankers, access 
to rivers and wells) are operated or controlled by third parties, States 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 45 (2003), 
para. 10.
101 General Comment 12: Right to adequate food (Twentieth session, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 
(1999), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 62 (2003), para. 27.
102 Id., para. 27.
103 Id., para. 23.
104 Id., para. 20.
105 See, id., paras. 8 and 10.
106 General Comment 15: The right to water (Twenty-ninth session, 2003), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 
(2002), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 105 (2003), para. 27.
107 Id., para. 49.
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parties must prevent them from compromising equal, affordable, and 
physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable water. To prevent such 
abuses an effective regulatory system must be established…which includes 
independent monitoring, genuine public participation and imposition of 
penalties for non-compliance.108
Therefore, participation in decision-making processes that affect individuals’ exercise 
of the right to water must be an integral part of any policy concerning water.109 Devising 
and periodically reviewing a national water strategy and plan of action addressing the 
whole population on the basis of a participatory and transparent process is, in actual 
fact, mentioned by the Committee as one of the so-called core obligations in relation to 
the right to water.110
 In the area of employment, the Committee has also acknowledged the challenges 
posed by privatisation. Sticking to Maastricht Guidelines’ innovative tripartite 
framework of state obligations (i.e. the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil),111 the 
Committee emphasises in the context of the obligation to protect, that protecting the 
right to work includes the duties of states parties to adopt legislation or to take other 
measures ensuring ‘that privatisation measures do not undermine workers’ rights’.112 
This means, among other things, that states parties must prohibit and combat forced or 
compulsory labour by non-state actors. Combating discrimination and unequal treatment 
of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups in both the public and the 
private sectors is considered one of the core obligations under the right to work.113 In 
a section of the General Comment entitled ‘Obligations of Actors other than States 
Parties’ the Committee considered that:
all members of society – individuals, local communities, trade unions, 
civil society and private sector organizations – have responsibilities 
regarding the realization of the right to work. States parties should 
provide an environment facilitating the discharge of these obligations. 
Private enterprises – national and multinational – while not bound by the 
Covenant, have a particular role to play in job creation, hiring policies and 
non-discriminatory access to work. They should conduct their activities 
on the basis of legislation, administrative measures, codes of conduct and 
other appropriate measures promoting respect for the right to work, agreed 
between the government and civil society.114
The key to promoting equal access to employment lies again in the formulation and 
implementation of an adequate national strategy that mainstreams participatory 
rights. An adequate national strategy on employment should also include ‘effective 
involvement of the community and, more specifically, of associations for the protection 
and promotion of the rights of workers and trade unions in the definition of priorities, 
decision-making, planning, implementation and evaluation of the strategy to promote 
employment’.115 Mainstreaming participatory rights in combination with general efforts 
to promote employment is considered another core obligation under the right to work.116
108 Id., para. 24. In this regard, the Committee has, for instance, expressed concern about access to and 
distribution of water to all people living in the occupied Palestinian territories, and urged Israel to ensure 
that ‘all parties concerned participate fully and equally in the process of water management, extraction and 
distribution’ (E/2004/22 (2003) 42 [Israel]). 
109 Id., para. 48.
110 Id., para. 37.
111 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, 22-26 
January 1997; which doctrinal framework is frequently drawn on in the Committee’s post-1997 General 
Comments.
112 General Comment 18: The right to work (Thirty-fifth session, 2006), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (2006), 
para. 25.
113 Id., para. 31(b). This is further strengthened by considerations on the role the state must play vis-à-vis 
the private sector in paras. 26, 38 and 43.
114 Id., para. 52.
115 Id., para 42.
116 Id., para 31(c).
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 Turning to the issue of social security, the Committee first of all posits that in addition 
to public schemes, privately run schemes, forms of self-help and other measures such 
as community-based or mutual schemes, are in principle compatible with the ICESCR, 
as long as such schemes conform to the essential elements of, and can be viewed as 
contributing to the right to social security.117 That said, the Committee points out that 
‘[w]here social security schemes, whether contributory or non-contributory, are operated 
or controlled by third parties, States parties retain the responsibility of administering 
the national social security system and ensuring that private actors do not compromise 
equal, adequate, affordable, and accessible social security’.118 The same arguments 
extend more specifically to private pension schemes, private social insurance schemes, 
and private health insurance schemes (see also infra).119 To prevent abuses, an effective 
regulatory system must be established which includes genuine public participation: 
‘Beneficiaries of social security schemes must be able to participate in the administration 
of the social security system. The system should be established under national law and 
ensure the right of individuals and organizations to seek, receive and impart information 
on all social security entitlements in a clear and transparent manner’.120 
 The Committee has acknowledges the challenges posed by privatisation in the area 
of health (care): 
Obligations to protect include, inter alia, the duties of States to adopt 
legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal access to health 
care and health-related services provided by third parties; to ensure 
that privatization of the health sector does not constitute a threat to the 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, 
goods and services; to control the marketing of medical equipment and 
medicines by third parties; and to ensure that medical practitioners and 
other health professionals meet appropriate standards of education, skill 
and ethical codes of conduct.121
In the area of health, too, the Committee emphasises that, despite the fact that it 
is ultimately only the state that can be held accountable for failing to discharge its 
international duties, it is not only the state that bears responsibility: non-state actors, 
including health professionals, families, local communities, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations, civil society organizations, as well as the private business 
sector, all have responsibilities in helping to realise the right to health.122 The Committee 
refers to the participation of the population in the provision of preventive and curative 
health services as one of the core obligations under the right to health.123 Participatory 
rights must pertain to ‘the organization of the health sector, the insurance system and, in 
particular, participation in political decisions relating to the right to health taken at both 
the community and national levels’.124 Participatory rights in the area of health and well-
being also have a special focus on the rights of older persons: they must be in a position 
to participate actively in the formulation and implementation of policies that affect their 
well-being particularly.125
117 General Comment 19: The right to social security (art. 9) (Thirty-ninth session, 2007), U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/19 (2008), para. 5.
118 Id., para. 46. See also para. 17.
119 Id., paras. 9, 13, 32, and 34.
120 Id., para. 26, as further emphasised in paras. 42, 46, 69, 
121 General Comment 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health (Twenty-second session, 
2000), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 85 (2003), 
para. 35 (emphasis in original).
122 Id., para. 42, further underscored in paras. 55 and 56.
123 Id., para. 43(f). Further underscored in paras. 11, 23, 34, and 54.
124 Id., para. 17.
125 General comment No. 6: The economic, social and cultural rights of older persons (Thirteenth session, 
1995), U.N. Doc. E/1996/22 at 20 (1996), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 34 (2003), 
paras. 5 and 39. Note that the EU recently has codified a right of the elderly to participation: Article 25 of 
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 In the area of access of persons with a disability, the UN Secretary-General had 
already indicated as early as 1992 that ongoing developments, including privatisation, 
have especially negatively impacted upon the access and participation of persons with 
disabilities:
Current economic and social deterioration, marked by low-growth rates, 
high unemployment, reduced public expenditure, current structural 
adjustment programmes and privatisation, have negatively affected 
programmes and services...If the present negative trends continue, there is 
the risk that [persons with disabilities] may increasingly be relegated to the 
margins of society, dependent on ad hoc support.126
Building on these concerns, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
considers:
Given the increasing commitment of Governments around the world 
to market-based policies, it is appropriate in that context to emphasize 
certain aspects of States parties’ obligations. One is the need to ensure 
that not only the public sphere, but also the private sphere, are, within 
appropriate limits, subject to regulation to ensure the equitable treatment 
of persons with disabilities. In a context in which arrangements for the 
provision of public services are increasingly being privatized and in which 
the free market is being relied on to an ever greater extent, it is essential 
that private employers, private suppliers of goods and services, and other 
non-public entities be subject to both non-discrimination and equality 
norms in relation to persons with disabilities. In circumstances where such 
protection does not extend beyond the public domain, the ability of persons 
with disabilities to participate in the mainstream of community activities 
and to realize their full potential as active members of society will be 
severely and often arbitrarily constrained.127 
Concerning a different area altogether, privatisation may furthermore affect the public’s 
right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author (article 
15, paragraph 1 (c), of the ICESCR), in so far the process of privatisation results in 
a situation where it is no longer only the state that influences the protection of these 
moral and material interests. Therefore, the Committee has provided that states parties 
must create a favourable climate for the realisation of that right. This means that states 
must take appropriate steps to ensure that the private business sector is not only aware 
of but also pro-actively considers the effects on the enjoyment of other human rights 
upon the right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from one’s scientific, literary and artistic productions.128 States that have ratified the 
ICESCR are further urged to consider regulating the responsibility resting on the private 
business sector, private research institutions and other non-state actors to respect the 
relevant rights.129 Failure to ensure the informed participation of authors and groups of 
authors in any decision-making process that has an impact on their right to benefit from 
the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from their productions may 
constitute a violation of the duty to fulfil the right at stake.130
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01, which entered into force as per 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
126 A/47/415, para. 5 (as referenced by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights its General 
Comment No. 5).
127 General Comment No. 5: Persons with disabilities (Eleventh session, 1994), U.N. Doc E/1995/22 at 19 
(1995), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 24 (2003), para. 11.
128 General Comment 17: the right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (2006), para. 48. 
129 Id., para. 55.
130 Id., para. 34.
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 In the context of ensuring the generic equal right of men and women to the enjoyment 
of all economic, social and cultural rights, the Committee once more directly dealt with 
the issue of privatisation. The Committee emphasises in the context of the obligation to 
protect that in cases where public services have been partially or fully privatised, states 
parties have an obligation ‘to monitor and regulate the conduct of non-state actors to 
ensure that they do not violate the equal right of men and women to enjoy economic, 
social and cultural rights’.131 It is furthermore an important aspect of the state’s obligation 
to fulfil to pro-actively guarantee equal participation of men and women in decision-
making in all programmes related to the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights.132
4 Education: The Limits of Participatory Rights in Times of Privatisation
Participatory rights are not, however, the remedy to the issues of privatisation in each 
and every substantive area that was once considered a “public affair”. A prime example 
of this would be the case of education.133 Particularly in the event that education is 
‘contracted out’, as it were, to (private) religious institutions, it is difficult to see how 
a complimentary focus on participatory rights could remedy a lack of access. Non-
religious parents, or parents adhering to a different religion, would likely be unwilling 
to participate in the affairs of schools that affiliate with a religion that is not theirs; after 
all, this would probably be the reason why they would not send their children to the 
school in question. Moreover and importantly, it cannot reasonably be expected that 
they rely on the available participatory rights to try to mend interferences with their 
parental liberties and their children’s rights.
 This concern is far from academic, as indicated by the workings of the treaty-
monitoring bodies.134 First of all, it should be made clear that international human 
rights law does not take a stance against private (or specifically religious) schools per 
se.135 The state must respect the right of parents not to avail of the schools established 
by the public authorities and their choice to opt for private educational institutions 
(for instance, so as to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in 
conformity with their own convictions).136 That said, the foremost positive obligation 
flowing from the right to education is for the state to ensure sufficient public schooling 
131 General Comment 16: Article 3: the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, 
social and cultural rights (Thirty- fourth session, 2005), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/3 (2005), para. 20.
132 Id. para. 21 (final bullet point). Other elements of participatory rights are mentioned in paras. 14, 31 
and 37.
133 Perhaps it is no coincidence that Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its General 
Comment on the right to education (see Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment 13: The right to education (Twenty-first session, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999), 
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 70, 2003), unlike virtually all the other Comments 
on substantive socio-economic rights (as extensively outlined in section 3 above), does not mainstream 
participatory rights concerning the right to education (the references to participation in paras. 1, 4, and 
30, id., do not have the effect of mainstreaming participatory rights, but rather refer to the intended output 
of adequate education: participation in a free society; while the references to participation in paras. 39-40 
are reserved for participatory rights in higher and academic education, as stated in para. 38, id.). That is, 
despite the fact that the Committee does recognise the challenge also posed by privatisation in relation to 
access to education (e.g., Id., at para. 41, on the need to ensure that school discipline is in accordance with 
the ICESCR in private schools; and para. 59, Id., on the need to ensure that private educational institutions 
conform to the minimum educational standards).
134 This section draws on J.D. Temperman, ‘State Neutrality in Public School Education’, 32 Human 
Rights Quarterly 4, at 873–875.
135 The state is under no duty, however, to fund such private educational establishments, e.g.: General 
Comment 13, at para. 54. 
136 As long as these schools conform to such minimum educational standards laid down by the state. 
E.g. Articles 13, paras. (3) and (4), of ICESCR; art. 5, para. (1)(b), of the UNESCO Convention against 
Discrimination in Education of 14 December 1960; also implied by art. 5, para. (2) of the Declaration on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. res. 
36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (1981).
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with appropriate curricula. This means that a predominantly religious society cannot 
completely ‘contract out’ education to private religious institutions. Or, as the case may 
be, the state may not allow institutionalised religion to monopolise – and thus privatise 
– the provision of education altogether, as this would inevitably lead to concrete access 
issues for (religious or non-religious) minorities. The Human Rights Committee recently 
reproached Ireland on this issue, observing that:
the vast majority of Ireland’s primary schools are privately run 
denominational schools that have adopted a religious integrated curriculum 
thus depriving many parents and children who so wish to have access to 
secular primary education…The State party should increase its efforts to 
ensure that non-denominational primary education is widely available in 
all regions of the State party, in view of the increasingly diverse and multi-
ethnic composition of the population of the State party.137
If the state fails in its positive obligation to provide non-denominational education, by 
for instance – as would in practice often be the case – maintaining historical church 
prerogatives in this area, then various educational and religious rights are inevitably 
infringed.138 Ireland’s Equality Act makes the situation for children of non-religious 
parents even worse as it allows denominational schools, which are virtually all Catholic, 
to refuse admission to pupils who do not adhere to the denomination in question. This 
rule is based on the arbitrary grounds of preserving the religious ‘ethos of the school’.139 
Such a system fosters serious human rights violations for various reasons. First, given 
the lack of secular state-run schools and the possibility that children of non-religious 
parents are turned away by denominational schools, no appropriate form of education 
may be available to these children. Furthermore, secular parents who would prefer 
religious education over no education at all might feel compelled to obtain the necessary 
religious affiliation, for example, by means of conversion or baptising their children to 
meet enrolment requirements.140 
 Some treaty monitoring bodies have criticised the laissez-faire attitude on the part 
of the state towards education for other, perhaps even more fundamental reasons. 
Whenever the state fails in its positive duty to provide sufficient non-denominational 
state schools, the state may be actively – albeit perhaps inadvertently – contributing to 
religious segregation. The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, for 
instance, assessing the educational system in Northern Ireland, observed that public 
schools in the region are:
heavily segregated, with most Protestants attending Protestant schools and 
most Catholics attending Catholic schools and only approximately 2 per 
cent of the school population attending integrated schools. The…current 
government policy, which appears to consist of a willingness to consider 
the conversion of existing Protestant or Catholic schools into integrated 
schools if it is the wish of the majority in a given school, is ineffective and 
likely to preserve the status quo.141
Thus, generally speaking, a far more pro-active policy on making available public 
education is needed, especially in pluralist societies (which is, nowadays, virtually 
every society). Privatisation in extremis of education does not solely affect access of 
pupils, but also impacts on equal opportunities for the providers of education, school 
teachers (and, consequently, the right to work and recognized equal opportunities in 
137 CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3 (2008), para. 2 [Ireland].
138 See A. Mawhinney, Submission to the Human Rights Committee with Respect to the Third Periodic 
Report of Ireland [NGO Information], March 2008; this shadow report is a response to U.N. GAOR, Hum. 
Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/IRL/3, paras. 409-11
139 Art. 7, para. (3)(c) of the [Irish] Equal Status Act, No. 8/2000.
140 Both problems are reported in the mentioned shadow report, above n.138, at 2, 4; similar concerns have 
been raised by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in its Conclusion Observations: 
A/60/18 (2005), para. 142 [Ireland].
141 E/1998/22 (1997) 56 at para. 301 (UK); reiterated in 2002: E/2003/22 (2002) 39 at paras. 226 and 245 
(UK).
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that area). Religious affiliation – or the lack thereof – may, naturally, not be imposed 
as an occupational requirement for public school teachers or staff. However, equal 
opportunities in this area (employment of school teachers) run the risk of being frustrated 
if the state allows a situation to emerge where there are no (or insufficient) public schools 
available, having contracted out education altogether to private (religious) institutions, 
or sanctioning a situation wherein religious institutions monopolise the running of 
education, including the appointment of school teachers.142
 Though private religious education is certainly a unique form of privatisation, it 
provides an illustration of precisely the type of contentious area in which participatory 
entitlements may be limited in their function as remedial rights. 
5 Conclusion
In the light of the challenges posed by privatisation, the time seems right to rethink 
the discourse on public participation. Human rights conventions are considered living 
instruments, capable of re-adjusting to contemporary challenges and issues.143 The issue 
of privatisation poses a definite contemporary challenge.144 Privatisation affects the 
enjoyment of the right to public participation itself, but also impacts on other rights. 
The key to remedying this situation lies largely – though not exclusively or necessarily, 
as illustrated in the case of the privatisation of education (see section 4) – in a critical, 
renewed discourse concerning participatory rights.
 Starting with the right to public participation itself, we have seen (in section 2) 
how the right to public participation has traditionally been rather tightly linked to the 
exercise of governmental power: participatory rights as a right to engage, actively or 
passively, in politics. In the meantime, however, a number of specialised human rights 
conventions have broadened the scope of participatory rights considerably. The sum 
of these standards can be taken to construe the right to public participation, in line 
with contemporary developments and notably in line with privatisation, so as to create 
a standard that goes beyond a mere generic duty upon the state to organise regular, 
free elections. Treaty-monitoring bodies should take into account all relevant specific 
– political as well as macro-economic; national as well as local – circumstances, 
including processes of privatisation. This approach could mean that occasionally, 
specific circumstances warrant fulfilment of a concrete right to be directly involved 
142 The Human Rights Committee has, for instance, condemned Costa Rican legislation (A/49/40 vol. I 
(1994), paras. 158 and 162) which confers on the National Episcopal Conference the power to select 
teachers for religious instruction, a step that effectively means that non-Catholics are barred from teaching 
religion subjects in the public school curricula. It stands to reason that a very limited religious occupational 
requirement scheme could apply to the specific position of religious instructor (in both denominational 
schools as well as public schools that have a religion subject on the curriculum), except if the religion 
subject is a neutral subject about religions rather than religious instruction. However, that does not mean 
that the state has no obligations in this regard or that all arrangements as to hiring appropriate persons 
to teach the religion subject suffice. In the case at hand, the influence exercised by Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference was such that appointment of non-Catholics was unlikely.
143 For a practical account on the living instrument doctrine or approach, see P. Plowden and K. Kerrigan, 
Advocacy and Human Rights: Using the Convention in Courts and Tribunals (2004), particularly at 26–27. 
See also M.P. Van Alstine, ‘Dynamic Treaty Interpretation’, 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
3 (1998), at 687–793. Particularly the European Court of Human Rights has consistently argued in its case 
law that the European Convention on Human Rights must be seen as a ‘living instrument’ which ‘must 
be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’ (e.g. Soering v. the United Kingdom, ECHR, (1989), 
Application No. 14038/88, 102; Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, ECHR, (2005), Application No. 44774/98, 136; 
Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), ECHR, (1995), Application No. 15318/89, 71). For an analysis 
of the dynamic treaty interpretation doctrine at the Council of European level, see, e.g., R. Bernhardt, 
‘Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention on Human Rights’, 42 German 
Yearbook of International Law 11 (1999), at 11-25. The Human Rights Committee, too, has considered ‘that 
the [ICCPR] should be interpreted as a living instrument and the rights protected under it should be applied 
in context and in the light of present–day conditions’ (e.g. Roger Judge v. Canada, Communication No. 
829/1998, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/ 1998 (2003), Views of 5 August 2002).
144 As does the issue of globalization, for that matter – something that goes beyond the scope of the present 
account (see, however, the text referenced by and within above n. 30). 
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in decision-making processes, namely when decisions could affect the rights or legal 
position of identifiable stakeholders. In sum, effective participation in public life in 
times of privatisation must be construed so as to mean that no decisions directly affecting 
stakeholders’ rights and interests may be taken without their informed participation, if 
not informed consent.
 Privatisation, in addition to impacting the right to public participation itself, risks 
negatively affecting other substantive rights, for example individual entitlements to 
adequate housing, adequate food and water, work, social security or health (see section 
3). The key to remedying the negative effects resulting from privatisation again lies 
largely in a renewed discourse on participatory rights. In the present context, efforts 
to mainstream participatory rights with the different substantive areas, as carried out 
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, significantly mitigate the 
ramifications of privatisation. As long as states ensure the informed consent, and at least 
the informed participation, of groups or individuals in both public and private decision-
making processes that potentially impact upon their legal position and on their rights 
and the enjoyment thereof, most fundamental rights can be fulfilled despite privatisation 
processes. 
 The example of privatisation of education, however, shows that one must be realistic 
about the potential and the limitations of participatory rights in relation to the challenge 
posed by privatisation (see section 4). Discourse on effective participation in public 
life in times of privatisation, emphasising that decisions directly affecting rights and 
interests should not be taken without the informed participation, if not informed 
consent, of stakeholders, will be increasingly important. The complimentary focus 
on mainstreaming participatory rights with all relevant substantive human rights in 
areas where the individual is dependent on a private provider for his or her enjoyment 
of individual (socio-economic) entitlements will also become more imperative. 
Participatory rights, however, are not a wholesale solution to the challenge that is 
privatisation. In areas where a renewed discourse on participatory rights cannot provide 
a remedy for privatisation, the only alternative lies in reiterating the state’s positive 
state obligations, and more specifically, emphasising the fact that the state remains at 
all times the ultimate duty bearer under international law and is primarily responsible 
for ensuring that human rights obligations are fulfilled. This may mean that the state 
will not be allowed to stand by idle when certain public policy matters become fully 
privatised. 

